NYC Commission on Human Rights adopts new rules addressing transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals discrimination

NYC Commission on Human Rights adopts new rules addressing transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals discrimination

Source: Amanda M. Gomez, Esq., Employment, Labor & Workforce Management at the  New York office of Epstein Becker Green. 

The New York City Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”) has adopted new rules (“Rules”) which establish broad protections for transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals. The Rules, which define various terms related to gender identity and expression, re-enforce recent statutory changes to the definition of the term “gender,” and clarify the scope of protections afforded gender identity status under the New York City Human Rights Law. New York Statealso just added gender identity and expression as protected classifications under the state Human Rights Law, following the adoption of the Gender Expression Non-Discrimination Act.

The text of Ms.Gomez's article is posted on the Internet at"

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nyc-commission-human-rights-adopts-rules-establishing-broad-interpretation-laws?utm_content=21dff93cbf4b8883f6a723f068dbc0fa&utm_campaign=Labor%20and%20Employment%20News2-21-2019&utm_source=Robly.com&utm_medium=email

Challenging the credibility of the witness

Challenging the credibility of the witness

Ghastin v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2019 NY Slip Op 01152, Appellate Division, First Department

The Plaintiff in this action asked Supreme Court to vacate an Education Law §3020-a arbitrator's award that found the individual guilty of certain disciplinary charges and imposed a penalty of suspension without pay for four weeks. Supreme Court granted the New York City Department of Education's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition and Plaintiff appealed. 

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court's ruling.

Plaintiff had objected to the hearing officer's "credibility determinations" with respect to the testimony of the Department's witnesses at the hearing. The Appellate Division said that the fact that the hearing officer found the testimony of the Department's witnesses more credible than Plaintiff's testimony does not serve to demonstrate that the hearing officer's determination was arbitrary and capricious.*

As to the penalty imposed by the hearing officer, the court observed that Plaintiff  failed to demonstrate how a four-week suspension without pay is so shockingly disproportionate to the offenses involved that it constitutes an abuse of discretion "given her proven misconduct which could have resulted in violence."

Noting that the Plaintiff had some 19 years of service at the time of the hearing with no known disciplinary record before the incident, the Appellate Division said that the record shows that Plaintiff failed to acknowledge the gravity of her misconduct, continued to deny any wrongdoing and showed a lack of remorse for her actions.

Another issue raised by Plaintiff: Did the hearing officer have jurisdiction to decide the matter. However, Plaintiff first raised this issue in the petition filed in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, citing Matter of DeMartino v New York City Department of Transportation, 67 AD3d 479 said that raising the question of the jurisdiction of the hearing officer was of "no moment" as Petitioner is deemed to have "waived the issue" when it was not raised in the course of the arbitration.

* The Appellate Division described the testimony of the Department's witnesses as "interlocking and closely corroborating".

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_01152.htm

Reports and audits issued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

On February 15, 2019 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits were issued.

Source: Office of the State Comptroller

Links to material posted on the Internet highlighted in COLOR

Procurement of Electricity and Natural Gas through Aggregators (2018MS-5)

Local governments and school districts did not always evaluate procurement options or make comparisons to benchmark rates to ensure they received the lowest prices for electricity and natural gas. Five of seven entities reviewed (city of Albany; counties of Broome, Cortland and Oneida; and North Syracuse Central School District) spent approximately $2.4 million more for electricity than the benchmark rate used by auditors.

Bainbridge Fire District – Board Oversight (Chenango County)

The board established adequate controls to help safeguard assets, and the legally required procurement policy, investment policy and code of ethics were in place. The treasurer’s financial records and reports accurately and properly accounted for all financial activities. Although the board did not perform a formal annual audit of the treasurer’s records, it reviewed reports each month and performed a thorough audit of claims before they were paid to ensure they were supported and funds were used for legitimate expenditures.

Town of Hyde Park – Payroll and Time Records (Dutchess County)

Controls over payroll and time records were adequate to ensure the accuracy of payroll and time records.  While the town has a good system in place, it could be further improved by filing approved time sheets electronically instead of printing them out only to have paper copies on file in order to save the time and expense of printing. 

Town of Lyons – Real Property Tax Exemptions Administration (Wayne County)

The assessor granted a total of 633 non-New York State School Tax Relief Program property tax exemptions for non-municipal owned property on the 2017 assessment roll, collectively reducing the town’s 2018 taxable assessed value by more than $34 million. The assessor granted exemptions without applications, renewal forms or supporting documentation and did not correctly calculate granted exemptions.

Town of Moravia – Real Property Tax Exemptions Administration (Cayuga County)

The assessor granted 306 non-NYS School Tax Relief Program exemptions on non-municipal owned property on the 2017 assessment roll, which collectively reduced the town’s 2018 taxable assessed value by more than $12 million. Auditors reviewed 85 exemptions totaling $9.3 million and identified issues with 68 exemptions totaling $6.9 million (74 percent). The files related to the 85 granted exemptions and found that 68 exemptions (80 percent) totaling $6.9 million in town-exempt assessed value lacked one or more required supporting documents to determine eligibility or verify the accuracy of the exemption calculation.

Town of Solon – Financial Management (Cortland County)

The board did not adopt a fund balance and reserve policy or create comprehensive multiyear financial and capital plans. From Dec. 31, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2017, general fund unrestricted fund balance increased by $106,230 (110 percent). Over the same three-year period, highway fund unrestricted fund balance increased by $50,007 (24 percent).

On February 15, 2019 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits were issued.

Source: Office of the State Comptroller

Links to material posted on the Internet highlighted in COLOR

Procurement of Electricity and Natural Gas through Aggregators (2018MS-5)

Local governments and school districts did not always evaluate procurement options or make comparisons to benchmark rates to ensure they received the lowest prices for electricity and natural gas. Five of seven entities reviewed (city of Albany; counties of Broome, Cortland and Oneida; and North Syracuse Central School District) spent approximately $2.4 million more for electricity than the benchmark rate used by auditors.

Bainbridge Fire District – Board Oversight (Chenango County)

The board established adequate controls to help safeguard assets, and the legally required procurement policy, investment policy and code of ethics were in place. The treasurer’s financial records and reports accurately and properly accounted for all financial activities. Although the board did not perform a formal annual audit of the treasurer’s records, it reviewed reports each month and performed a thorough audit of claims before they were paid to ensure they were supported and funds were used for legitimate expenditures.

Town of Hyde Park – Payroll and Time Records (Dutchess County)

Controls over payroll and time records were adequate to ensure the accuracy of payroll and time records.  While the town has a good system in place, it could be further improved by filing approved time sheets electronically instead of printing them out only to have paper copies on file in order to save the time and expense of printing. 

Town of Lyons – Real Property Tax Exemptions Administration (Wayne County)

The assessor granted a total of 633 non-New York State School Tax Relief Program property tax exemptions for non-municipal owned property on the 2017 assessment roll, collectively reducing the town’s 2018 taxable assessed value by more than $34 million. The assessor granted exemptions without applications, renewal forms or supporting documentation and did not correctly calculate granted exemptions.

Town of Moravia – Real Property Tax Exemptions Administration (Cayuga County)

The assessor granted 306 non-NYS School Tax Relief Program exemptions on non-municipal owned property on the 2017 assessment roll, which collectively reduced the town’s 2018 taxable assessed value by more than $12 million. Auditors reviewed 85 exemptions totaling $9.3 million and identified issues with 68 exemptions totaling $6.9 million (74 percent). The files related to the 85 granted exemptions and found that 68 exemptions (80 percent) totaling $6.9 million in town-exempt assessed value lacked one or more required supporting documents to determine eligibility or verify the accuracy of the exemption calculation.

Town of Solon – Financial Management (Cortland County)

The board did not adopt a fund balance and reserve policy or create comprehensive multiyear financial and capital plans. From Dec. 31, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2017, general fund unrestricted fund balance increased by $106,230 (110 percent). Over the same three-year period, highway fund unrestricted fund balance increased by $50,007 (24 percent).

Tenure may be acquired by estoppel

Tenure by estoppel 

Wilson v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op 01161, Appellate Division, First Department

An employee may attain tenure by estoppel as the result of the appointing authority's failing to provide the individual with timely notice that his or her services will not be continued beyond his or her probationary period.*

Citing McManus v Board of Educ. of Hempstead Union Free School District, 87 NY2d 183, the Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court's ruling that annulled New York City Department of Education's [DOE] discontinuing Petitioner's employment and directed the educator's reinstatement to her former position as a tenured teacher with back salary.**

DOE had appointed Petitioner as a teacher in 2011 and her initial 3-year probationary period was set to expire in 2014. Prior to the date on which Petitioner probationary period was to expire, she and DOE entered into a written agreement extending her probation through September 8, 2015. 

In March 2015, DOE temporarily reassigned Petitioner to perform certain clerical duties. Significantly, DOE did not advise Petitioner concerning its decision regarding her status as a probationary teacher upon her reassignment. In March 2016, DOE discontinued Petitioner's clerical assignment and  directed her to resume performing her teaching duties. The Appellate Division's decision reports that after resuming her teaching duties Petitioner was involved in an incident with her school principal and she "took an unapproved leave of absence." On June 15, 2016, DOE notified Petitioner that "it was discontinuing her probationary service as of July 15, 2016."

The Appellate Division explained that a probationary teacher typically acquires tenure by estoppel when a school board fails to take the action required by law to either [1] grant or deny tenure to the individual prior to the expiration of the teacher's probationary term and [2] accepts the continued services of an educator in his or her position. Here, said the Appellate Division, Petitioner obtained tenure by estoppel at the end of her extended probationary period as the result of DOE's failure to deliver the notice of it's decision to terminate her on or before September 8, 2015.

In addition, the court noted that DOE failed to advise Petitioner that the temporary assignment to perform clerical duties would not count toward her satisfying her probationary term of service. Accordingly, Petitioner's decision to accept the temporary reassignment did not "serve to disrupt" Petitioner's  probationary period nor did it result in an automatic extension  of her probationary term for a period equal in length to the period of her service in a clerical capacity.

Having attained tenure in her position as an educator by estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as tenure by acquiescence or tenure by default, Petitioner could only be removed from her position for cause, after notice and hearing.

In contrast, for the purposes of determining the duration of the probationary period, if a teacher is absent during his or her probationary period, the appointing authority may take appropriate action to extend the probationary period for a period of time equal to such absence.

The same is true with respect to absence during the probationary period of employees in the classified service.*** However, with respect to employees in the classified service, the appointing authorities may be given discretion to waive a limited period of such absence pursuant to the rules of the responsible civil service commission. Otherwise the minimum and maximum periods of the probationary term of the employee are extended by the number of workdays of such absences not counted as time served in the probationary term” [see, for example, 4 NYCRR 4.5(g), “Absence during probationary term”].

Another element to consider is the extension of the probationary period in the event an employee is given a “light duty” or some other alternate assignment while serving his or her probationary period [see Boyle v Koch, 68 NY2d 60].

* If the notice of termination of the employee's service is timely given, the last day of service need not coincide with the last day of his or her probationary period. If the termination date of service of the individual is made effective within a reasonable time of the last day of his or her probationary period, such as to coincide with the end of the next payroll period, the courts will not deem the probationer to have obtained tenure by estoppel as the result of the “carryover” [see Mendez v Valenti, 101 AD2d 612].

** The Supreme Court's ruling was subsequently amended to provide that amount earned by the Plaintiff from a specified date to a later specified date would be deducted from the amount of back pay owed to Plaintiff by the Department of Education.

*** The positions of teachers and school administrators are typically in the Unclassified Service [see Civil Service Law §35, subdivisions g through and including k].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_01161.htm

National emergency at the US-Mexico border declared

National emergency at the US-Mexico border declared

Source: New York Time news report, February 12, 2019

[This post was updated February 18, 2019]

On February 12, 2019 the New York Times published a news article reporting that President Trump "declared a national emergency at the border ... to access billions of dollars to build a border wall [and] would sign the declaration to protect the country from the flow of drugs, criminals and illegal immigrants coming across the border from Mexico, which he characterized as a profound threat to national security."

A joint statement concerning the Emergency Powers Act by members of Western Michigan University Cooley Law School’s Constitutional Law Department is set out below:

“Over the years, Congress has delegated expansive powers to the President to declare national emergencies. This delegation of emergency powers poses a threat to the delicate separation of powers between Congress and the President set forth in the Constitution. The President’s declaration of an “emergency” allowing him to fund the border wall is the latest test of the emergency powers statute and will surely lead to a dramatic expansion of presidential powers if left unchecked.”    

Constitutional Law Professors at WMU-Cooley include:

Professor Gerald Tschura – Auburn Hills campus

Assistant Dean and Professor Devin Schindler – Grand Rapids campus

Associate Dean and Professor Michael McDaniel – Lansing campus

Professor Brendan Beery – Tampa Bay campus

The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law has assembled a listing of relevant provisions of federal law that may be cited as authority for actions taken in the event of a declaration of a national emergency is issued and has posted this information on the Internet at https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers.

The Brennan Center has summarized the basics with respect to a President's declaring a national emergency as follows:

50 USC §§1601-1651 - National Emergencies Act (1976): "With respect to acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency”.

The Center's analysis continues: "The National Emergencies Act imposes procedural requirements on the President’s exercise of emergency powers. It has governed the declaration of multiple emergencies. For a complete list of emergencies declared under this statute, see here."

  50 U.S. Code §1622 - National emergencies

The provisions of 50 U.S. Code §1622, addressing the termination of a national emergency, are set out below:

(a) Termination methods

Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with this subchapter shall terminate if—

(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the emergency; or

(2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.

Any national emergency declared by the President shall be terminated on the date specified in any joint resolution referred to in clause (1) or on the date specified in a proclamation by the President terminating the emergency as provided in clause (2) of this subsection, whichever date is earlier, and any powers or authorities exercised by reason of said emergency shall cease to be exercised after such specified date, except that such termination shall not affect—

              (A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined on such date;

                (B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or

                (C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to such date.

(b) Termination review of national emergencies by Congress

Not later than six months after a national emergency is declared, and not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.

(c) Joint resolution; referral to Congressional committees; conference committee in event of disagreement; filing of report; termination procedure deemed part of rules of House and Senate

(1) A joint resolution to terminate a national emergency declared by the President shall be referred to the appropriate committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be. One such joint resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days after the day on which such resolution is referred to such committee, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(2) Any joint resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days after the day on which such resolution is reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(3) Such a joint resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the appropriate committee of the other House and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days after the day on which such resolution is referred to such committee and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days after the day on which such resolution is reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(4) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such joint resolution within six calendar days after the day on which managers on the part of the Senate and the House have been appointed. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed in the House in which such report is filed first. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within forty-eight hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

(5) Paragraphs (1)–(4) of this subsection, subsection (b) of this section, and section 1651(b) of this title are enacted by Congress—

             (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the House in the case of resolutions described by this subsection; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

                (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(d) Automatic termination of national emergency; continuation notice from President to Congress; publication in Federal Register

Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with this subchapter, and not otherwise previously terminated, shall terminate on the anniversary of the declaration of that emergency if, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.

(Pub. L. 94–412, title II, § 202, Sept. 14, 1976, 90 Stat. 1255; Pub. L. 99–93, title VIII, § 801, Aug. 16, 1985, 99 Stat. 448.)

Penalty of termination imposed on a employee found to have been conducting private business activities "on company time"

Penalty of termination imposed on a employee found to have been conducting private business activities "on company time"

Ficken v Suffolk Vocational Education Board, 238 A.D.2d 589

An employee of Suffolk County's Vocational Education and Extension Board [VEEB] was conducting a personal business activity while simultaneously being employed by VEEB. The problem was that the employee was alleged to have been conducting some of her personal business on VEEB property and on VEEB time.

Although warned several times not to conduct her personal business affairs while on VEEB property and that her failure to comply with directive could result in disciplinary action, the employee persisted in conducting some of her personal business while at work. This resulted in the employee being charged with, and found guilty of, misconduct characterized as theft of services. The penalty imposed: termination. 

The employee appealed the disciplinary action taken against her, claiming that there was no substantial evidence to support the appointing authority's determination. 

The Appellate Division disagreed and dismissed the appeal challenging the disciplinary action taken against her. The court explained that the employee's admission that she met with a client to conduct aspects of her business on VEEB property and on "VEEB time," coupled with the testimony of two co-workers that the employee typed documents related to her business activities while "at work," was "sufficient to provide substantial evidence to sustain the findings of misconduct."

As to the penalty imposed, the Appellate Division, citing Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222, said that under the circumstances, dismissal was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be "shocking to one's sense of fairness."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997827238ad2d5891242

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Improper performance of a judicial function by a legislative body

Improper performance of a judicial function by a legislative body

Porcari v Griffith, 2019 NY Slip Op 00918, Appellate Division, Second Department

In 2016, the individuals [Plaintiffs] initiating this action were appointed to certain local offices by the Mayor of the City of Mount Vernon. Later that same year the Mount Vernon City Council enacted an ordinance declaring that the offices occupied by the Plaintiffs were "vacant" because the Plaintiffs were not residents of the City within the meaning of §50-38* of City's Code.

The ordinance as enacted also required the City's Comptroller to "... immediately cease payment of salary and benefits to Plaintiffs."** The Comptroller ceased paying salary and benefits to Plaintiffs notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs continued to perform the duties of their respective offices.

The Plaintiffs thereupon brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the actions of the members of the City Council and the Comptroller, alleging that City Council "exceeded its legislative authority in enacting the ordinance that declared that the offices held by the plaintiffs were vacant." Plaintiffs asked Supreme Court to issue an order enjoining their suspension, termination, any interference with their salary and benefits or preventing them from performing the duties and responsibilities of the positions to which they had been appointed by the Mayor. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' motions and Mt. Vernon appealed the court's ruling.

The Appellate Division, noting that the "party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of equities in its favor," explained that "the decision to grant a preliminary injunction is a matter ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the motion" and "[i]n the absence of unusual or compelling circumstances, [the] court[s] [are] reluctant to disturb said determination."

The Appellate Division then opined that Plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits on their claim that the City Council "improperly performed a judicial function" by enacting an ordinance  "declaring" that the local offices were vacant within the meaning of §50-38 of the City of Mount Vernon's Code.*** In addition, said the court, Plaintiffs also demonstrated "a danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, and that the equities balance in their favor."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's determination granting Plaintiffs' motion for the preliminary injunction.

* Article III, [Residency Requirements] of Chapter 50 [Personnel Policies] set out in City of Mount Vernon's Code requires certain local officers and employees to be residents of the City of Mount Vernon [See https://ecode360.com/6600350].

** The Appellate Division's decision indicates the City Council overrode the Mayor's veto of the ordinance.

*** §36 of the Public Officer Law sets out the procedures for the removal of a town, village, improvement district or fire district officer other than a justice of the peace.  Typically, such officers may be removed from office for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversion in office by the filing of an application for such removal with the Appellate Division have jurisdiction.  

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_00918.htm

Proposed amendment to 2 NYCRR 315.5 will permit certain special duty assignments performed by sworn officers to qualify as public safety overtime in determining the individual's retirement allowance

Proposed amendment to 2 NYCRR 315.5 will permit certain special duty assignments performed by sworn officers to qualify as public safety overtime in determining the individual's retirement allowance

Source: New York State Register, February 13, 2019

The Department of Audit and Control has posted a notice of a proposed amendment of 2 NYCRR 315.5 to provide that certain special duty assignments qualify as public safety overtime and qualify as allowable service in determining the Retirement System member's retirement allowance.

The Retirement System explains that it has:

"[L]ong considered certain special duty assignments that consisted primarily of security work performed by public safety professionals at the request of a private entity on a voluntary basis, paid or reimbursed by the private entity, performed under the direction of the private entity, or primarily for the benefit of the private entity not to be creditable because such assignments did not constitute paid public service with a participating employer.

"Courts have upheld the Retirement System’s position that such work, often referred to as 'private entity overtime,' was not allowable service and was not within the realm of the employee’s duties for the participating employer. In recent years, however, the manner in which special duty assignments performed at the request of private entities are assigned, supervised, and compensated has changed.

"Today, special duty assignments are often mandatory and are directed and controlled by the public employer. Compensation to the employee is paid by the public employer, not the private entity.

"In recognition of the changing nature of special duty assignments, the Retirement System has determined that those special duty assignments that meet the criteria established by the Retirement System, qualify as “public safety overtime” and shall be considered allowable service."

The text of the proposed amendment is posted on the Internet at:

https://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2019/feb13/rulemaking.pdf

Reimbursement of retiree Medicare premiums found to be a form of deferred compensation may not be unilaterally discontinued by the employer

Reimbursement of  retiree Medicare premiums found to be a form of deferred compensation may not be unilaterally discontinued by the employer

Holloway v City of Albany, 2019 NY Slip Op 00940, Appellate Division, Third Department

In 2012 the Firefighters' Union [Union] filed a contract grievance and demanded arbitration when the City of Albany [Albany] said that it was ending its longstanding practice of reimbursing retired firefighters for their Medicare Part B premiums with respect to those who enrolled in the program on or after January 1, 2010.  The Union alleged that Albany's action violated §27.1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA].* 

An arbitrator ruled that the Medicare Part B premium reimbursement was a component of "the existing health insurance plan" and that it could not be ended absent compliance with the provisions set out in §27.1 of the CBA. Subsequently the same arbitrator conducted an expedited proceedings to determine whether a health insurance plan without the reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums provided coverage "substantially equivalent" to one with such reimbursements. The arbitrator decided that it did not and directed Albany to make whole "all individuals affected by [the reimbursement's] elimination." The arbitrator's awards were confirmed in an action taken pursuant to CPLR Article 75.

However, the Union determined that firefighters either enrolled in Medicare Part B after January 1, 2010 or will be doing so and, notwithstanding the 2012 arbitration award, had not been and would not be reimbursed by the City for their Medicare Part B premiums. Accordingly, in 2015 the Union initiated the instant action contending that Albany [1] had breached whichever CBA was in effect at each such firefighter's retirement and [2] was collaterally estopped** by the 2012 arbitration award from arguing to the contrary.

Supreme Court, however, determined that the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel did not apply, found ambiguities in the language of §27.1 of the CBA and denied the Union's motion for summary judgment. The Union appealed. 

Acknowledging that §27.1 of the CBA, as written, is ambiguous, the Union argued that the proceedings culminating in the 2012 arbitration award resolved, with preclusive effect, that ambiguity in its favor. The Appellate Division agreed, explaining that arbitration awards are entitled to collateral estoppel effect and, citing Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 NY2d 183, said such an award "will bar a party from relitigating a material issue or claim resolved in the arbitration proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to litigate."

Observing that it was undisputed that the arbitration proceeding afforded Albany  a "full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues therein," the Appellate Division said that the only question is whether the firefighters in this action, as the parties seeking to invoke collateral estoppel, satisfied their burden of showing the identity of the issues  "between those resolved in the arbitration awards and those in play here."

In the 2010 arbitration award, said the court, the arbitrator observed that Albany had reimbursed retired firefighters for their Medicare Part B premiums since the 1960's and did so for decades after it was no longer required, leading her to conclude that the reimbursement constituted part of the "existing health insurance plan" that could not be discontinued absent compliance with the provision set out in §27.1 of the CBA.

Albany had also contended that §27.1 had no applicability because retired firefighters were not "members of the bargaining unit" protected by that contract provision. The arbitrator also rejected this argument, holding that the reimbursement was a form of deferred compensation and was one of the health insurance benefits afforded to current employees.  In the words of the Appellate Division, although retirees are no longer part of the collective bargaining unit upon their retirement "the arbitrator determined that §27.1 applied because the reimbursement entitlement was earned by the retirees while they were working."

Noting that the 2010 and 2012 arbitration awards were never vacated and are binding and the firefighters  retired during the period that the reimbursement was provided to retirees under CBAs containing §27.1, the Appellate Division held that Albany "is obligated to reimburse retired firefighters for these payments under the CBA"

This, said the Appellate Division, Justice Mulvey dissenting, "is dispositive of the claims raised here" and thus the firefighters have met their burden of showing identity of issue, and their motion for summary judgment should have been granted by Supreme Court.

* §27.1 of the collective bargaining agreements at issue required the City to "present proposals to the [firefighters'] [u]nion for discussion and possible agreement" if it "wishe[d] to change the existing health insurance plan." In the absence of agreement, an arbitrator would be tasked with determining "whether the new . . . proposal grants substantially equivalent coverage to members of the bargaining unit" so as to be permissible.

** The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars an issue that has already been litigated by the  parties from being later relitgated by those same parties..

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_00940.htm

A public employee alleging that he or she has been "wrongful terminated" is required to bring a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement and unpaid salary

A public employee alleging that he or she has been "wrongful terminated" is required to bring a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement and unpaid salary

Village of Northport v Krumholz, 2019 NY Slip Op 00926, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Defendant in this action was appointed Treasurer of the Village of Northport and served in that capacity until the Village discovered that she had been appropriating Village funds to herself.*

The Village commenced this action against Defendant alleging that she had improperly written checks to herself from Village funds. Defendant filed a counterclaim alleged "wrongful termination and violation of Public Officers Law §36"** and asked the court to direct her reinstatement and payment of back salary.

Supreme Court granted the Village's motions summary judgment on its conversion and  its breach of fiduciary duty causes of actions, and dismissed, as time-barred, Defendant's counterclaim. Defendant appealed, contending that Supreme Court should not have granted Village's motion for summary judgment dismissing her counterclaim.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's rulings, explaining that:

1. Defendant was required to bring a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 in order to pursue her claim of wrongful termination and to seek reinstatement and unpaid salary; and

2. Citing Austin v Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y. , 5 NY2d 430, a CPLR Article 78 proceeding is the exclusive remedy for a discharged public employee, who must seek reinstatement prior to seeking unpaid salary.

As the Village established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Defendant's counterclaim as time-barred, the claim not having not been filed within the controlling four-month statute of limitations, the Appellate Division noted that Defendant "was effectively terminated" in March, 2009 but did not file her counterclaim until January 4, 2013.

* Earlier Defendant had brought an action United States District Court "seeking overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act" and alleged that her employment with the Village should not have been terminated without notice and hearing. The federal court dismissed Defendant's Fair Labor Standards Act claim and declined to consider the state law questions she presented. The filing of her federal action, however, did not toll the running of the controlling statute of limitations with respect to the litigation of Defendant's state law issues. Similarly, neither the filing an appeal from an administrative decision in accordance with a grievance procedure [Matter of Matter of Hazeltine v City of New York, 89 AD3d 613] nor a request for reconsideration of a final administrative decision [Cappellino v Town of Somers, 83 AD3d 934] toll the running of the statute of limitations for bringing an Article 78 action.

** §36 of the Public Officer Law sets out the procedures for the removal of a town, village, improvement district or fire district officer other than a justice of the peace.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_00926.htm

Applying compensation limitations retroactively

Applying compensation limitations retroactively

People v Edward J. Murphy, 235 A.D.2d 554

In 1993 certain limitations on the amount of compensation that a BOCES Superintendent could receive were enacted into law [Chapter 295, Laws of 1993].

In the Murphy case the Appellate Division concluded that the limitations set out in Chapter 295 did not apply retroactively.

The case arose when the State attempted to recover a portion of what the Appellate Division described as an "overly generous BOCES compensation package (which included extensive sick and vacation leave time and the right to liquidate this leave at full-pay)" granted to its then BOCES Superintendent Edward J. Murphy,

The Court said that "while improvident, BOCES' offer to Murphy, and his acceptance of the overly generous BOCES compensation package ... did not violate any articulated public policy."

Further, the Court ruled that although the law now places a limitation on the amount of compensation that a BOCES superintendent may receive, "at the time Murphy began working at BOCES and continuing throughout his tenure as the BOCES district superintendent, the law provided for no such restrictions. Accordingly, the Court decided, Murphy's employment agreements with BOCES were neither illegal nor unauthorized.

The ruling suggests that all or part of a "compensation package" in place prior to the effective date of the enactment or the amendment of a law limiting the compensation of a public officer or a public employee then in service may survive judicial challenge even if the compensation package is in excess of that authorized by the law as enacted or amended.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997789235ad2d5541272