A limitation on an arbitrator’s discretion to fashion a remedy must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause

A limitation on an arbitrator’s discretion to fashion a remedy must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause
Matter of Town of Scriba (Teamsters Local 317), 2015 NY Slip Op 05316, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Teamsters Local 317 (Union) appealed from an order and judgment of Supreme Court granting the application of the Town of Scriba [Scriba] to vacate an arbitration award. 

The stipulated issue submitted to the arbitrator asked "[w]as the suspension and termination of the [g]rievant, … for just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?"

Among other things, the arbitrator had determined that, although maintaining a commercial driver's license (CDL) was a minimum standard for employment, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) did not mandate the employee's discharge from employment upon forfeiture of his CDL and, thus, Scriba did not have just cause to terminate the grievant.

The arbitrator fashioned a remedy whereby the grievant would be suspended without pay, and Scriba could terminate his employment only if he did not regain a valid CDL on or before a particular date.

Scriba appealed to the Supreme Court seeking an order vacating the arbitration award on the ground that the award exceeded the scope of the arbitrator's power.  Union filed a cross petition seeking to confirm the award pursuant to CPLR 7510. Supreme Court granted the Scriba’s motion to vacate the arbitration award.

Union appealed the Supreme Court’s decision and the Appellate Division agreed with the Union that Supreme Court erred in vacating the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitration award should have been confirmed.

The court said that it agreed with Union that the arbitrator did not exceed a specifically enumerated limitation on his authority, explaining that "It is well established that an arbitrator has broad discretion to determine a dispute and fix a remedy and that any contractual limitation on that discretion must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause itself."

The Appellate Division said that the relevant part of the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] stated only that "[i]f the dispute [regarding a grievance] cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the issue may be submitted to final and binding arbitration."  The court concluded that the CBA provided no "specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" and that "the remedy sought was expressed in open-ended terms that certainly did not limit the arbitrator's power to grant any specific relief."

 

The court also agree with the Union that the award was not irrational, explaining that "An award is irrational if there is no proof whatever to justify the award” and so long as an arbitrator offers “even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached” the arbitration award must be upheld.

Here, said the Appellate Division, “the language of the CBA is ‘reasonably susceptible of the construction given it by the arbitrator’ and the arbitrator offered a ‘colorable justification for the outcome reached.'”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05316.htm

Placement on involuntary leave as the result of disability not work-related under color of Civil Service Law §72.5

Placement on involuntary leave as the result of disability not work-related under color of Civil Service Law §72.5

2015 NY Slip Op 05318, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In August 2011, a firefighter [Firefighter] was removed from active duty because of an on-the-job hypoglycemic incident caused by his diabetes. Although Firefighter, his union, and the City's Fire Department subsequently engaged in negotiations regarding Firefighter's status, Firefighter was not formally notified that he had been placed on an immediate involuntary leave of absence pursuant to Civil Service Law §72.5 until April 2012.*

Firefighter challenged the decision. Ultimately a hearing officer determined that Firefighter had been properly placed on immediate involuntary leave, but additionally determined that he should be allowed to return to work and granted Firefighter some remedial relief.

In September 2013 the Fire Department Chief, reviewed the Hearing Officer's determination and decided that Firefighter should remain on involuntary leave, with no remedial relief. Firefighter appealed that determination to the County Department of Personnel, which affirmed the Fire Chief’s decision.

Firefighter filed a CPLR Article 78 petition in Supreme Court seeking to annul the determination that he was unfit for active duty as a firefighter because of his inability to manage his diabetic symptoms. Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g).

The Appellate Division agreed with Firefighter that the Fire Department did not strictly comply with the procedural requirements of the Civil Service Law, concluding that the procedural protections contained in Civil Service Law §72.1 apply to proceedings brought pursuant Civil Service Law §72.5 based on the language in §72.1 that the provisions of notice and hearing therein apply to employees "placed on leave of absence pursuant to this section" (emphasis in the opinion), "which includes Civil Service Law §72.5."

The court explained that these procedures are necessary "to afford tenured civil servant employees... procedural protections prior to involuntary separation from service," citing Sheeran v NYS Department of Transportation, 18 NY3d 61. The Appellate Division said that "[b]ecause of the significant due process implications of the statute, strict compliance with its procedures is required."**

Here it was undisputed that Fire Department did not strictly comply with the procedures set out in §72 for placing petitioner on immediate involuntary leave inasmuch as it was not until April 2012 that Firefighter was provided with "[w]ritten notice of the facts providing the basis for the judgment of the appointing authority that [Firefighter was] not fit to perform the duties of" his position. Although the parties had engaged in negotiations during the period before the Fire Department provided Firefighter with written notice, the Department conceded that at no time did Firefighter waive his rights under section §72.

The absence of strict compliance with these procedural requirements renders Firefighter’s alleged leave a nullity prior to September 30, 2013, when the Fire Chief issued his final determination after reviewing the Hearing Officer's decision. Accordingly, said the Appellate Division Firefighter is entitled to back pay and the restoration of benefits from August 26, 2011 until September 30, 2013.

However, said the court, it concluded that the determination that Firefighter was unfit for active duty is supported by substantial evidence that Firefighter “was rendered unfit to serve as an active duty firefighter because of his inability to manage his diabetic symptoms.

However, the Appellate Division said that as the Fire Department had “violated lawful procedure after initially determining that [Firefighter] was unfit for active duty in August 2011,” it said that Firefighter was entitled to a hearing, should he request one, to determine his current fitness to be reinstated, provided that his application for reinstatement is made within one year of our decision herein”, explaining that while  Firefighter “is not within the one-year time period for seeking reinstatement … [Fire Department is] estopped from asserting that [Firefighter] is time-barred from seeking such relief because the delay was caused by [Fire Department’s] failure to comply with the procedures.”

* An individual unable to perform the duties of his or her position as the result of an occupational injury or disease is placed on Workers' Compensation Leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §71.

** Termination of an employee placed on leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §72 is effected pursuant to Civil Service Law §73 as a matter of the exercise of discretion by the appointing authority.

N.B. An employee terminated from a “§72” leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §73 “may, within one year after the termination of such disability, [emphasis supplied],  make application to the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction over the position last held by such employee for a medical examination to be conducted by a medical officer selected for that purpose by such department or commission” rather within one year of the effective date of the employee’s termination from a §72 leave pursuant to §73. The same is true with respect to an employee terminated from service while on §71 Workers' Compensation Leave.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05318.htm

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Employee terminated after being found guilty of inflicting corporal punishment on pupils

Employee terminated after being found guilty of inflicting corporal punishment on pupils

2015 NY Slip Op 05787, Appellate Division, First Department

The New York City Chancellor of Education's Regulation A-420 prohibits inflicting corporal punishment on a student. Corporal punishment is defined as "any act of physical force upon a pupil for the purpose of punishing the pupil."

An individual [Petitioner] employed by the New York City Board of Education was charged with, and found guilty of, inflicting corporal punishment on  pupils by the arbitrator and the penalty imposed was termination from service.

Petitioner challenged the arbitration award and Supreme Court vacated the penalty imposed and remanded the matter “for determination of a lesser penalty.”

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, on the law, and entered a judgment confirming the award.

The court said that the “penalty of termination does not shock our sense of fairness,” noting that Petitioner had committed four separate acts of corporal punishment, in violation of Chancellor's Regulation A-420, three of these acts having occurred after he  had been formally warned that any recurrence of his misconduct would result in further disciplinary action and he had been referred to a mandatory training workshop on "appropriate behavior intervention strategies." The court also that the pupils who suffered the corporal punishment were “non-verbal autistic children, incapable of protecting themselves or reporting what happened to them.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05787.htm

Resigning from one’s position for “good cause” is critical to the individual’s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

Resigning from one’s position for “good cause” is critical to the individual’s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

2015 NY Slip Op 05542, Appellate Division, Third Department

An applicant for Unemployment Insurance Benefits [Claimant] resigned from her position as the circulation coordinator at a public library after seven years of service. She was denied benefits and an administrative law judge [ALJ] sustained the administrative ruling following a hearing.

Claimant appealed and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board reversed the ALJ’s determination and found that Claimant was, indeed, entitled to receive benefits. The employer appealed the Board’s decision.

The Appellate Division said that "'Whether a claimant has good cause to leave his or her employment is a factual determination to be made by the Board, and its decision will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence.'"

Here, said the court, Claimant testified to an ongoing conflict with the technology coordinator at the library, which testimony was supported by another employee. When Claimant brought these facts, along with other facts regarding the technology coordinator actions, to her supervisor’s attention, the supervisor offered no assistance to Claimant. Claimant then sought assistance from management, but was told that she would not receive assistance without the support of her supervisor.

Deferring to the Board's credibility determinations regarding the testimony of the witnesses at its hearing, the Appellate Division explained that there was substantial evidence for the Board's findings that Claimant's employer failed to take “even minimal steps to confirm or refute the alleged report that the technology coordinator had been inappropriately monitoring” Claimant's whereabouts and activities during Claimant's breaks.

The court said that it found no reason to disturb the Board's determination that such inaction by the employer provided good cause for claimant to leave her employment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05542.htm

Membership in the New York State Employees’ Retirement System is critical to an employee’s earning member service credit

Membership in the New York State Employees’ Retirement System is critical to an employee’s earning member service credit

2015 NY Slip Op 05532, Appellate Division, Third Department

Retirement and Social Security Law §102 (e) provides that “In the event that a disability retiree is restored to active service of an employer, at a salary less than his [or her] final salary but equal to or in excess of the current minimum salary for the position from which he [or she] was last retired for disability, such person, if he [or she] so elects, shall again become a member of the retirement system and his [or her] retirement allowance shall cease. He [or she] thereafter shall contribute to the retirement system in the same manner as and at the same rate that he [or she] paid prior to his [or her] disability retirement. The total service credit, to which he [or she] was entitled at the time of such retirement, again shall be credited to him [or her]. Upon his [or her] subsequent retirement, he [or she] shall be credited, in addition, with all member service earned by him subsequent to his [or her] last restoration to membership.*

A member of the New York State Employees’ Retirement System [NYSERS] employed by a State agency retired due to illness in 1980 and was receiving an ordinary disability retirement allowance. In 1985 the individual’s [Retiree] health improved and she was reemployed by her former agency. However, upon returning to employment Retiree did not rejoin the Retirement System** and continued to receive her disability pension benefit as authorized Retirement and Social Security Law §102(e) in addition to her receiving her salary.

In 1995 Retiree asked NYSERS to provide her with her service credit in the System and she was informed that she had accumulated 10 years, 7 months and 15 days of service credit between 1969 and 1980. In addition, Retiree was expressly told that she was not "receiv[ing] service credit for time worked after retirement while [she was] also receiving pension benefits."

In 2006 Retiree wrote to NYSERS inquiring as to whether she had in fact applied to be "restored to membership" in the System and, further, whether it was possible to retroactively obtain service credit for her postretirement work.

After being advised that she could not simultaneously collect her disability pension benefit and be an active member of NYSERS earning service credit., the matter proceeded to an administrative hearing. The Hearing Officer found, among other things, that Retiree was not entitled to additional service credit. The Comptroller adopted the Hearing Officer's findings in this regard and Retiree initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Comptroller's determination.

The Appellate Division sustained the Comptroller decision, noting that “the Comptroller “is charged with the responsibility of determining service credits for retirement purposes and his determination will be upheld if rational and supported by substantial evidence."

Retiree, said the court, as the party seeking additional service credit bore the burden of demonstrating her entitlement to such credit.” In this instance the court said that §102 governs postretirement employment by disability pensioners and dictates, based upon the disability retiree's final salary following his or her return to active service, whether membership in the Retirement System is mandatory or optional. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Retiree's salary upon returning to active service did not make membership in the System mandatory and while Retiree explored the possibility of becoming, once again, a member of the System, she never actually exercised her option to do so.

In the words of the Appellate Division: “Absent membership in [NYSERS] following her return to service in 1985, and in light of her continued receipt of disability pension benefits, [Retiree] simply was not entitled to earn additional service credit."

The decision also notes that despite Retiree’s arguments to the contrary, “the Comptroller was not under an affirmative duty to either apprise [Retiree] of all available options relating to her retirement benefits or ensure that she selected the most advantageous benefit.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the Comptroller's determination denying Retiree additional service credit was supported by substantial evidence and dismissed her appeal.

* In contrast, §102 d of the Retirement and Social Security Law provides as follows: In the event that a disability beneficiary is restored to active service of an employer, at a salary equal to or in excess of his [or her] final salary, his retirement allowance shall cease. Such person thereupon again shall become a member of the retirement system. He thereafter shall contribute to the retirement system in the same manner as and at the same rate that he [or she] paid prior to his [or her] disability retirement. The total service credit, to which he [or she] was entitled at the time of such retirement, again shall be credited to him [or her]. Upon his subsequent retirement, he [or she] shall be credited, in addition, with all member service earned by him subsequent to his [or her] last restoration to membership.

**  An individual’s membership in NYSERS ceases upon his or her retirement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05532.htm