Illinois Supreme Court rules that Rahm Emanuel a "resident" for the purpose of running for mayor of Chicago
Walter P. Maksym Et Al. , Appellees, v The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, Docket No. 111773.
Reversing the Appellate Court, the Illinois Supreme Court essentially equated the term “residence” as used in §3.1-10-5(a) of the City’s Municipal Code to “domicile.”* The court, noting that “until just a few days ago, the governing law on this question had been settled in this State for going on 150 years,” citing Smith v. People ex rel.Frisbie , 44 Ill.16 (1867), sustained the decision of Chicago's Board of Elections that Rahm Emanuel was eligible to run for the office of Mayor of the City of Chicago.
The Supreme Court explained that “in assessing whether the candidate has established residency, the two required elements are: (1) physical presence, and (2) an intent to remain in that place as a permanent home. Once residency is established, the test is no longer physical presence but rather abandonment, the presumption is that residency continues, and the burden of proof is on the contesting party to show that residency has been abandoned. Both the establishment and abandonment of a residence is largely a question of intent, and while intent is shown primarily from a candidate’s acts, a candidate is absolutely competent to testify as to his intention, though such testimony is not necessarily conclusive.”
* NYPPL earlier suggested that “Essentially the [Illinois Supreme Court] will decide if the term “residence” as used in §3.1-10-5(a) of [Chicago's] Municipal Code means “domicile” or something other than "domicile” [see http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2011/01/legal-distinction-between-domicile-and.html ]
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/47691816/Illinois-Supreme-Court-Decides-Rahm-Emanuel-Can-Run-in-Chicago-Mayoral-Election?DCMP=NWL-cons_breakingdocs
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